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This paper outlines a semantic approach to weak islands, a phenomenon that has 
traditionally been thought of as purely syntactic. Weak islands are environments 
that allow some, but not other, wh-phrases to extract. E.g., 
(l) 	 Which mani are you wondering [whether to invite -J! 
(2) * 	 How; are you wondering [whether to behave -.]? 
Two proposals will be considered. The first was developed in Szabolcsi and 
Zwarts (1990, 1991). It took the syntactic theory of Relativized Minimality as a 
point of departure, and reinterpreted its generalizations as follows: 
(3) 	 Wh-phrases that are sensitive to weak islands are the ones that 
range over partially ordered domains, rather than discrete individu-
als. 
(4) 	 Weak islands are environments in which the interveners between 
the wh-phrase and its trace cannot be composed into an upward 
monotone function. 
(5) 	 The link between (3) and (4) is that only upward monotone func-
tions preserve partial ordering. 
This proposal, in particular (4) and (5), has certain descriptive and conceptual 
shortcomings, however. These point to a revision in terms of scope. The charac-
terization of island-sensitive phrases in (3) is retained, but its significance is 
explicated in terms of the impoverished structure semi-lattices have. 
(6) 	 The weak island effect comes about when the wh-phrase should 
take wide scope over some operator but it is unable to. 
(7) 	 For a wh-phrase to take wide scope over another scope bearing 
element SBE means that operations associated with SBE need to be 
performed in the domain of wh in order to compute an answer. 
When a wh-phrase ranges over discrete individuals, these can be 
collected into unordered sets. All Boolean operations can be per-
formed on sets. When a wh-phrase does not range over discrete 
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individuals, only a smaller set of operations (possibly none) are 
available in its domain, hence answers cannot be computed in the 
general case. 
(8) 	 Harmless interveners are harmless only in that they can give rise 
to at least one reading that presents no scopal conflict of the above 
sort: they can 'get out of the way'. But even they create an island 
effect if the sensitive wh-phrase has to expressly take scope over 
them. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the core weak islands 
data, and outlines the accounts in Rizzi (1990) and Cinque (1991) on the one hand 
and in Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1990, 1991) on the other. Section 2 explains the 
notion of individuals on which both the latter proposal and its subsequent revision 
are based. Section 3 summarizes the monotonicity account and points out its prob-
lematic aspects. Section 4 proposes an alternative account in terms of scope. The 
present paper focuses on why non-individual wh-phrases do not take wide scope. 
5.1 is concerned with claim (7). 5.2 introduces a novel set of data involving 
arguments of non-iterable predicates that support this account over ones in terms 
of discourse or thematic roles. 5.3 establishes a connection between event struc-
ture and whether the predicate denotes an ordered or an unordered set. 
1.1 Weak island facts and Relativized Minimality 
Islands for extraction come in two varieties. STRONG ISLANDS are absolute: they 
do not allow any wh-phrase to escape. Cinque (1991) argues that subject, com-
plex NP, and adjunct islands belong here: the NP gap they may contain is an 
empty resumptive pronoun, not a trace. WEAK ISLANDS, on the other hand, are 
selective: typically, phrases like which man can extract, but phrases like why, 
how, and how many pounds cannot. The cross-linguistically best known weak 
islands are infinitival/subjunctive/modal whether-clauses: 
(9) 	 a. Which man; are you wondering [whether to invite-;]? 
b.* Howi are you wondering [whether to behave-;]? 
(10) 	 a. Welke mani vraag jij je af [of je -i uit moet nodigen]? 
'Which man are you wondering whether you should invite?' 
b.* 	 Hoei vraag jij je af [of je -, moet gedragen]? 
'How are you wondering whether you should behave?' 
Extraction from embedded constituent questions is degraded or unacceptable for 
many speakers of English. In other languages these may either be strong islands 






Which mani are you wondering [who saw -J? 
Welke mani vraag jij je af [wie -; gezien heeft]? 
'Which man are you wondering who saw?' 
(13) Melyik embert, talalgattad, [hogy ki latta -a 
which man-ace were-you-guessing that who saw 
Although the variation in (11) through (13) is not well-understood, I will follow 
standard practice both in assuming that the strong islandhood of certain wh-
complements is syntactic in nature and in restricting my attention to examples that 
qualify as weak islands in the given dialect or language. 
Drawing from work by Obenauer and Ross, Rizzi (1990) and Cinque (1991) 
observe that the same kind of selectivity is exhibited by many further environ-
ments: the presence of beaucoup, negation or negative quantifiers, on/yphrases, 
adversative and factive predicates, and extraposition all create weak islands: 
(16) 	 a. Que! livre as-tu beaucoup consulte -? 
what book have-you a lot consulted 
b.* 	 Combien as-tu beaucoup consulte - de livres? 
how-many have-you a lot consulted of books 
(17) 	 a. Which man didn't you / did no one think that I invited -? 
b.* How didn't you / did no one think that I behaved -? 
(18) a. 	 Which man did only John think that I invited -? 
b. * 	 How did only John think that I behaved -? 
(19) 	 a. Which man did you deny / regret that I invited -? 
b.* How did you deny / regret that I behaved -? 
(20) 	 a. Which man was it a scandal that I invited -? 
b.* How was it a scandal that I behaved -? 
Compare the following good how-extraction: 
(21) 	 How did everyone I two men think that I behaved -? 
They propose the following uniform explanation for the contrasts in (9) and 
in (16) through (21): 
(22) 	 Referential wh-phrases can be long-distance linked to their traces 
via referential indices; non-referential wh-phrases need to be linked 
to their traces via an (antecedent-) government chain. 
(23) 	 The government chain between a non-referential wh-phrase and its 
trace is broken (i) by certain INTERVENERS, or (ii) if the clause 
from which we extract is not sister of a theta-marking [ + V] head. 
(24) 	 REFERENTIAL wh-phrases are those that both bear a thematic role 
like Agent, Patient, etc. and are Discourse-linked; NON-REFEREN· 
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TIAL wh-phrases are those that bear a role like Reason, Manner, 
Measure, etc. or are not D-linked. 
The majority of the weak island effects is attributed to (23i). What inter-
veners break the government chain between the how-type phrase and its trace? 
Rizzi's answer is in terms of syntactic positions. Developing the theory of Relati-
vized Minimality, he argues that since the extracted wh-phrase is in an A-bar 
specifier position, all and only intervening A-BAR SPECIFIERS count as relevant 
interveners. A-bar specifiers are phrases in a (non-adjoined) position where they 
do not receive thematic role and/or case. They contrast with complements, A-
specifiers, heads, and adjoined phrases. Rizzi analyzes whether, who, beaucoup, 
not, no one, only John and deny as A-bar specifiers, at S-structure or at LF. In 
contrast, he points out that everyone or two men acquire their scope by adjunction 
according to May (1985), so they are predicted not to block non-referential ex-
traction. Cinque adds that factive and extraposition islands are due to (23ii). 
As regards referentiality, Rizzi draws the crucial line between those phrases 
that refer to participants of the event and those that do not; the latter are claimed 
never to be able to escape from weak islands. Drawing from Pesetsky's (1987), 
Comorovski's (1989), and Kroch's (1989) work, Cinque adds that even event 
participants have to be Discourse-linked, i.e., refer to specific members of a 
PREESTABLISHED SET, to be referential. Phrases differ in their ability to admit of 
a D-linked interpretation, so a scale is predicted: 
(25) a. Which man do you regret that I saw -? 
b.? Who do you regret that I saw -? 
c.?? What do you regret that I saw -? 
d.?? How many books do you regret that I saw -? 
e.* How much pain do you regret that I saw -? 
f. * Who the hell do you regret that I saw -? 
1.2 Reinterpreting Relativized Minimality in semantic tent1S 
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1990, 1991) henceforth Sz&Z -- accept the above 
empirical generalizations and propose to reinterpret them in semantic terms. The 
motivation is three-fold. First of all, the data have a tempting semantic flavor. 
Second, certain problems with Rizzi's and Cinque's specific claims can be over-
come if the generalizations are stated in semantic terms. Third, there is a theoreti-
cal challenge. The Relativized Minimality account makes essential reference to 
traces. Does the weak island phenomenon indeed make traces indispensable, or 
can it be accounted for in a way that is neutral between theories with and without 
traces? 
The main claims in Sz&Z are as follows. The distinction between good ex-
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tractors and bad extractors can be characterized in denotational terms. The former 
range over INDIVIDUATED domains, the latter over domains whose elements 
exhibit a PARTIAL ORDERING (inclusion relations). Discourse context plays a role 
only in that it may individuate things that are normally partially ordered; this is 
an important but ancillary role. J will call good extractors 'individuals', regardless 
whether their individuation is inherent or contextual. The characterization of weak 
islands can be given in terms of the MONOTON1CITY properties of the items 
intervening between the extractor and its trace. Downward monotone and non-
monotone interveners block the extraction of non-individuals; upward monotone 
ones are harmless. The connection lies in the fact that only the upward monotone 
environments PRESERVE partial ordering. Since individuals are not partially or-
dered, they are not interested in whether order is preserved: they must be insensi-
tive to weak islands. Non-individuals are partially ordered, so they can naturally 
require that the structure of their domain be preserved between the extraction site 
and the landing site. 
These claims can be implemented in a grammar whether or not it has 
movement and traces. For instance, they can be expressed as a condition on wh--
trace relations. Or, they can be implemented in a categorial grammar that handles 
extraction using FUNCTION COMPOSITION: I 





Assume that how much milk is marked to apply to an expression of category S/NP 
only if it denotes an upward monotone function. This assumption is methodologi-
cally analogous to (in fact, is inspired by) Zwarts' (1986) claim that negative 
polarity items must be arguments of downward monotone functions. Categorial 
grammar assembles form and meaning simultaneously. Since monotonicity pro-
perties are inherited under composition, did you drink will be upward monotone, 
where.as didn't you drink will inherit downward monotonicity from n 't. 
In the following sections I discuss the empirical motivation for these claims 
in some detail, and then go on to point out some problematic aspects. 2 
1 If the extracted phrase is an adjunct, a functor looking for it is cre.ated by 
lifting the category to be modified by it. 
2 The combinatory grammars in Steedman (1987) and Szabolcsi (1992) have 
nothing to say about island constraints. To remedy this, Hepple (1990) introduces 
boundary modalities and what may be called a calculus of opacity. But he makes 
no empirical claims concerning what domains will be opaque for what relations, 
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2. Individuation: semantics versus pragmatics 
Consider a sample of wh-phrases: (i) which person(s), (ii) who, (iii) what, how 
many men, (iv) who/what rhe hell, (v) how many pounds, how much attention, 
how tall, how, why. Although the majority of scholars working on the subject do 
not examine the full sample, there is agreement that the phrases in (i) and (ii) 
extract most easily, and those in (iv) and (v) least easily, from weak islands. 
Furthermore, there is agreement that various degrees of contextualization enable 
practically any wh-phrase, save for why, to extract. The question is what distin-
guishes good and bad extractors and, in particular, what role contextualization 
plays. The arguments to be put forth in this section are consonant with Sz&Z but 
are significantly more elaborate. 
I argue that the crucial distinction is between wh-phrases that range over 
individuals and those that do not. I use the term individual to refer both to entities 
like John and Mary that are inherently discrete and to those, typically higher 
order, objects whose overlaps and complements we expressly choose to ignore. 
INDIVIDUALS can naturally be collected into UNORDERED SETS. ('Unordered' sets 
of course contrast with sets whose members exhibit inclusion relations and not 
with ordered tuples.) NON-INDIVIDL1ALS are then characterized by the fact that 
they exhibit a PARTIAL ORDERING, and this ordering is in fact taken seriously. 
The present notion of individuals is as in Szabolcsi (1983), a discussion of 
the focusing of common nouns in Hungarian in Montague Grammar. The con-
struction in (27) represents a split indefinite, rather than a partitive (see van 
Riemsdijk (1987) for German). The sentences are equally good with or without 
a numeral; in the latter case they mean 'at least one or. 
(27) a. Mit latott Mari (harmat)? 
what+acc saw Mary three+acc 
'What did Mary see (three of)?' 
b. Biciklit latott Mari (harmat). 
bike+acc saw Mary three+acc 
'It was bikes and nothing else that Mary saw (three ot)' 
Common nouns denote properties with natural overlaps and complements. If these 
all are honestly taken into account, (27b) cannot be interpreted as a sensible ex~ 
and why. The present paper tries to argue on empirical grounds that some of the 
island constraints are semantic in nature. It remains to be seen whether boundary 
modalities can encode the semantic generalizations or become, at least in this 
case, superfluous. 
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haustive answer. 3 Instead, properties need to be individuated: a set of relevant 
properties must be distinguished and Boolean operations disallowed. (In real life, 
the felicity of (27) does not require an explicit list of relevant properties; the 
existence of some criterion of relevance is sufficient.) Notice that once we make 
this move, it does not matter whether the co-relevant properties actually overlap: 
as we cannot intersect them, we cannot 'see' their overlaps. 
This procedure might be subsumed under contextualiz.ation: mi 'what' now 
ranges over members of some salient set. What I wish to stress here is that mi 
can only do this if we make the strictly semantic move of collecting properties 
into an unordered set, i.e., if we expressly ignore the ordering that is otherwise 
vital to them. The same semantic change takes place when we have strong D-
linking in the sense that the salient set is given as a checklist. Thus both prag-
matics and semantics are involved in individuation. My explanation of the weak 
island phenomenon will rest on the semantic aspect. 
Let us first see how the core examples can be described in terms of the indi-
vidual versus non-individual (ordered) distinction. Wh-phrases like which person 
can easily be taken to range over individuals (plural which persons, too, as long 
as the predicate is distributive; certain non-distributive cases will be taken up 
later). Who and, especially, what can range over not only individuals but also 
properties; the latter are ordered, see above. How many N-phrases have an 
individual interpretation but, like how many powuls and how much attention, also 
an amount interpretation. Amounts can only be made sense of in terms of an 
ordering. The individual/amount ambiguity of numeral phrases is highlighted by 
the presence or absence of copula agreement in Italian clefts (I owe the observa-
tion to Filippo Beghelli). The agreeing version (a) is insensitive to weak islands, 
the non-agreeing version (b) is sensitive: 
(28) a. Sono cinque donne che non ho invitato. 
'There are five women who I didn't invite' 
b.* E cinque donne che non ho invitato. 
'The number such that I didn't invite that many women is five' 
In French, combien-extraction unambiguously invokes the amount interpretation, 
although it is not a necessary condition for it: 
(29) a. Combien as-tu (*beaucoup) consulte de livres? 
b. 	 Combien de livres as-tu (beaucoup) consl,llte? 
C. 	 Combien de cercles as-tu (*beaucoup) dessine? 
'How many circles did you draw a lot? [* l,lnless types)' 
1 Rooth (1984) recognizes the same problem in connection with verbal ftx:l,IS. 
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Dobrovie-Sorin (1991) provides interesting evidence from Romanian that a how 
many-phrase has three distinct interpretations: amount, non-D-linked individual, 
and D-linked individual. D-linked animate direct objects in Romanian are clitic-
doubled (c). The following contrasts show that 'how many women' on the amount 
interpretation cannot extract from a factive island (a), but on the individual 
interpretation it can extract even if it is not D-linkcd, i.e., not clitic doubled (b):4 
(30) Cite femei regreti ca ai iubit? 
a." 'For what number, you regret having loved that number of wom-
en?' (answer: Three.) 
b. 'How many women are there such that you regret having loved 
them?' (answer: There are three such women.) 
C. Pe cite femei regreti ca le ai iubit'! 
'How many [ =which] of the women do you regret having loved?' 
(answer: Three, namely, A, B, and C.) 
Why requires a propositional answer, and propositions are ordered by entail-
ment, a special case of inclusion. It seems that manners, the domain of how, are 
also ordered; in particular, the components of the manner characteriLing each 
event do not form a set but a sum. This intuition can be corroborated by using 
only as a test. Only has two interpretations: 'exclusively' and 'merely'. The first 
applies to elements of unordered sets, the second to elements of ordered ones. 
They may differ in their syntax (see Harada and Noguchi 1992); some languages 
even have different words for the two: 
(31) 	 a. John visited London only in 1953 and 1961. 
'exclusively; German nur' 
b. 	 John's son was born only in 1990. 
'merely, recently; German erst' 
(32) 	 a. Er zijn alleen drie stoelen in de kamer. 
'There are only three chairs (and nothing else) in the room' 
b. 	 Er zijn slechls drie stoclen in de kamer. 
'There are only three chairs (and no more) in the room' 
Frans Zwarts observes that Dutch alleen means 'exclusively' and slechts 'merely'. 
It can thus serve to diagnose adverbs: 
(33) 	 a." Hij loste het probleem om 2:00 alleen elegant op. 
·He solved the problem at 2:00 only [ =exclusively] elegantly' 
4 Dobrovie-Sorin (1991) makes the crucial distinction in terms of restricted 
versus non-restricted quantification. 
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b.? Hij loste het probleem om 2:00 slechts elegant op. 
'He solved the problem at 2:00 only [=merely] elegantly' 
c. Hij loste het probleem om 2:00 slechts met tegenzin op. 
'He solved the problem at 2:00 only [=merely] reluctantly' 
d. Zijn hele !even, loste hij problemen alleen/*slechts elegant op. 
'In all his life, he solved problems only [ =exclusively] elegantly' 
(33a) with al!een elegant is unacceptable because the components of the manner 
in which the problem was solved on a particular occasion do not form a set; 
alleen elegant cannot mean 'of all manners, only elegantly'. (33b) with slechts 
elegant is somewhat strange, since elegance is towards the high end of the scale; 
(33c) with slechts met tegenzin is fine, since reluctance is towards the low end. 
{33d) switches to a bare plural object, whence we have a plurality of problem-
solving events. Each has a manner of its own, and these manners as wholes can 
be collected into a set. Here alleen elegant can be used: it means that the manner 
of every problem-solving was elegant. The judgments are the same for the Eng-
lish counterparts. There is a corresponding improvement in extracting abilities: 
(34) 	 a.* In what way didn't you solve the problem at 2:00? 
b. In what way did you never solve problems? 
{34a) may be acceptable, too, if the manner domain is turned into an unordered 
set by the brute force of D-linking, i.e., by providing an explicit list of manners 
to check and to report on each in the answer. 
The next question to ask is whether there are other cases that make invoking 
D-Iinking truly indispensable. Wh-the-hell expressions are a good candidate. Since 
Pesetsky (1987) it has been assumed that they form minimal pairs with their plain 
counterparts in that they are 'aggressively non-D-linked', whereas plain wh-
phrases are D-linkable. They seem to make a strong case for D-linking since they 
extract markedly less that their counterparts, e.g., 
(35) 	 a. Who are you wondering whether to invite? 
b.?? Who the hell are you wondering whether to invite? 
I wish to argue that D-linkability is not a minimal difference between wh-the-hell 
expressions and their plain counterparts. Consider the following pair: 
(36) 	 a. Who saw John on the way home? 
b. Who the hell saw John on the way home? 
Let us ignore the rhetorical or cursing uses of (36b). Even so, the contexts in 
which the two questions are usable are not the same. The existential presupposi-
tion wh-questions carry does not prevent (36a) from being an open question, 
readily answerable by Nobody. (36b) on the other hand can only be asked if we 
have unquestionable evidence that someone saw John, and merely wish to identify 
the person(s). The strength of this requirement is illustrated by a context I owe 
to Brnce Hayes. When asked what a felicitous use of Who thr hell saw his moth-
er? would be, he an,wered, 'ff we know that whenever someone sees his mother, 
God sends purple rain, then upon seeing purple rain, I can ask, Who the hell saw 
his mother?' Now, lacking the institution of purple rain, we typically do not have 
unquestionable evidence about the rather complex situations that weak island 
violations tend to describe, e.g., that you are wondering whether to invite a 
particular person, cf. (35h). This provides an explanation of why such questions 
are notoriously bad. On the other hand, in some situations we do have such 
evidence. E.g., seeing someone madly searching through the dictionary, we may 
ask (37) or, one thief, seeing another trying to smuggle an item back to a house 
just robbed, may ask (38): 
(37) What the hell do you still not know how to spell? 
(38) What the hell are you upset that you took? 
Tetsuya Sano (p.c.) informs me that these intuitions are parallelled by the inter-
pretation and behavior of illai-phrases in Japanese. I interpret these data as 
indicating that D-linking is not the critical factor in the behavior of wh-1he-hell 
expressions; they are bad extractors for independent reasons. 
These remarks have been intended to sup!X)rt the claim that the crncial 
feature of island-escapers is semantic. It appears that discourse context never 
makes a minimal difference for extractability. D-linking plays an im!X)rtant role 
when it forces, and facilitates, the individuation of a domain that is originally not 
individuated; but it is the ensuing semantic change, the creation of an unordered 
set, that matters for extractability.' 
3.1 Weak i,;lands and monotonicity 
Let us now turn to weak islands themselves. Sz&Z observe that the contexts Rizzi 
'Two remark~ on the data. (i) There are significant cross-linguistic differenc-
es in the behavior of wh-phrases. E.g., Dutch welk and Hungarian melyik are 
much less D-linked than which (but extract just as well). Or, Hungarian mikor, 
in contrast to when, ranges over individuals well and is a good extractor. (i1) In 
the Eighties why was the paradigmatic island-sensitive example, but it seems quite 
atypical: it is captured by any 'interesting' thing in sentence. The same holds for 
German warum, even though it can stay in situ (T. Kiss 1991, H. van Riemsdijk 
p.c.). 
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and Cinque characterize as weak islands share some simple monotonicity proper-
ties: they are all either DOWNWARD MONOTONE or NON-MONOTONE. 
(39) a. A function f is upward monotone if for every A, B 
in its domain, if A £ B, then f(A) <;; f(B). 
b. A function f is downward monotone if for every A, 
B in its domain, if A £ B, then f(A) 2 f(B). 
c. A function f is non-monotone if neither (a) nor (b). 
Let us briefly review how the material in I. l fits these notions. Not, no 
one and deny are dearly downward monotone: by the same token, we predict that 
Jew men and at most.five men also create weak islands. Wh-phrases, factives like 
regret, only-phrases, and beaucoup 'a lot' are analyzed as non-monotone. Since 
some of these items are focus-sensitive, I try to keep the focus structure of the 
examples constant:6 
(40) a. [I know the answer to the question] who/whether he exercises .-;-,, 
b. [I know the answer to the question] who/whether he docs pushups 
(41) a. John regrets that I exercise .-;_., 
b. John regrets that I do pushups 
(42) a. Only John exercises +-/--+ 
b. Only John does pushups 
(43) a. John exercises a lot +-/_., 
b. John does pushups a lot 
By the same token, we predict that exactly five men and i1{ten, etc. also create 
weak islands. On the other hand, items like think, John, eiuyone, rwo men, etc., 
6 Some comments on (41) and (43). (41) is clearly invalid in the b-a direc-
tion. The a---b direction may be tempting, but (b) has a more specific presupposi-
tion than (a), whence it cannot be entaile{! by (a). Some factives like know are 
upward monotone if taken extensionally. See Ladusaw (1980) on both points. In 
(43), the non-monotone analysis of heaucoup, a lot. etc. is inspired by 
Westerstahl (1985), who proposes four interpretations for many, two of which are 
non-monotone due to context-dependence. Suppose John docs nothing but push ups 
for exercise. What he does may count as a lot of pushups hut not as a lot of 
exercise, if the norms associated with the two arc different. De Swart (1991) 
points out that on this view seldom would be non-monotone, too, which contra-
dicts its ability to license negative polarity items. But this may be more of a 
problem for NPI-theories than for us: only John and regrer are also NPl-licensers 
and non-monotone. 
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which do not create weak islands, are UPWARD MONOTONE. (It is difficult to 
find a good sample of extraposition islands that are not also factive islands; no 
proposal is made for them in Sz&Z.) 
This descriptive characterization avoids some analytical problems that arise 
on Rizzi's and Cinque's analyses. They include the movement of deny, a head, 
into an A-bar specifier position at LF and the assumption that the complement of 
regret is not a sister to the verb. These have an alternative solution within 
Relativized Minimality, however: the adoption of Progovac's (1988) and 
Melvold's (1991) proposals to place empty operators in the [SPEC, CP] of the 
complements of deny and regret, which then serve as standard interveners. More 
important perhaps is the problem posed by the cross-linguistic variation in the 
syntax of negation. Recent work has attributed the variation to the fact that the 
negative particle may be a head, a specifier, or an adjunct. This would suggest 
that the island-creating effect of negation varies accordingly, but it does not: I am 
not aware of any language in which negation does not create a weak island. Rizzi 
(1992) proposes to solve this problem by assuming an empty A-bar specifier when 
NEG is a head, and vice versa. But this solution makes the original claim almost 
vacuous; it seems more natural to trace back the cross-linguistically uniform 
effect to the uniform semantics of negation. 
The most important question is why downward monotone and non-monotone 
contexts constitute weak islands. The definitions in (39) make it clear that upward 
monotonicity means simply that the function PRESERVES PARTIAL ORDERING; 
downward monotone functions reverse it and non-monotone ones obliterate it. 
Now recall that in the previous section I argued that island-sensitive phrases are 
characterized by the fact that they range over a partially ordered domain. It seems 
entirely natural for such a phrase to require that order be preserved by the path 
connecting it to its extraction site. On the other hand, wh-phrases that range over 
individuals do not have a partial order in their domain. Hence they cannot possi-
bly be sensitive to the preservation of order and must be immune to weak islands 
-- which they are. 
In sum, there seems to be a very natural connection between the semantic 
properties of islands and island-sensitive phrases. 
3.2 ProblenL~ 
The problems with the above proposal come in two varieties: descriptive and 
conceptual. 
(44) 	 There are downward monotone and non-monotone interveners that 
for many speakers do not create weak islands. 
(45) 	 There are upward monotone interveners which do create weak 
islands. 
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(46) 	 Two downward monotone items in the path do not (regularly) 
cancel out. 
(47) 	 The explanation of why downward monotone and non-monotone 
paths are islands is not as strong as it should be. 
Let us consider these in turn. 
First, Sz&Z predict that all non-upward monotone interveners are equally 
bad. Bui many speakers report a contrast betwe,en (48a) and (48b.c): 
(48) a.* How did few people think that you behaved? MON+ 
b. How did exactly five people think that you behaved? -MON 
C. How did at most five pe,ople think that you behaved? MON+ 
Second, Sz&Z predict that all upward monotone interveners are harmless. 7 
De Swart (1991) examines comhien-extraction and Dutch wm voor-split, and ob-
serves that clearly upward iterative adverbs like rwee kecr 'twice' create as bad 
islands as downward monotone ones. She also reanalyzes bcaucoup, vccl 'a lot' 
as upward monotone; this may be a matter of debate, cf. note 6, but 'twice' alone 
is sufficient to establish her case: 
(49} a. 	 Wat voor bockcn heb je twee kcer gelezen? 
what for books have you twice read 
'What (sort of) books have you read twice?' 
b."' Wat heb je twee kecr voor bocken gdezen? 
what have you twice for books read 
Third, the most natural implementation of Sz&Z's proposal, as was men-
tioned in 1.2, is to assume that interveners between the wh-phrase and its trace 
are composed into one big function, each contributing its own semantic properties 
to the result. This predicts that examples containing two downward monotone 
interveners are grammatical, since the composition of two downward monotone 
functions is upward monotone. Now, there is at least one case when this is borne 
out: 
(50) 	 a.* John is our hero. as you deny. 
b.* John is our hero. as no one knows. 
c. John is our hero, as no one denies. 
d. John is our hero. as you know. 
Many of our informants report that they sense an improvement with wh-extrac-
7 Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1991) has a chapter on 'gradience'. but its data are 
not built into the theory. I will return to this below. 
tion, too, but it does not prove significant under closer scrutiny: 
(51) 	 a.* How did he deny that you behaved? 
b.?? How did no one deny that you behaved? 
In view of this last observation one may choose to abandon the path-minded 
formulation of the hypothesis, and use monotonicity properties to characterize bad 
interveners. This, however, makes the explanation somewhat stipulative. 
Fourth, Sz&Z point out that the link between the partially ordered nature 
of sensitive extractors and the non-upward monotone nature of weak islands is not 
as strong as it should be. The theory explains clearly why individuals CANNOT 
be sensitive to weak islands, and why non-individuals CAN be. But it does not 
explain why they ARE sensitive, i.e., exactly what goes wrong when partial 
ordering is not preserved. 
Individually, these descriptive and conceptual problems are not devastating; 
they might be seen as calling for further research. Together, however, they 
indicate that the explanation is on the wrong track. 
To see an important source of the problems, let us recall a crucial assump-
tion of the Relativized Minimality theory (RM). The theory of LF that RM 
relies on is that of May (1985). According to this theory, structure (usually) does 
not disambiguate scope. (52), for instance, is assigned a single structure in which 
how is higher than everyone, but they govern each other, whence they can be 
interpreted in either scope order or even independently. The adoption of this 
theory for the purposes of RM results in the assumption that it does not matter 
which reading of the sentence we are considering; all we have to know is that 
everyone is in an adjoined position, whence its intervention between how and its 
trace must be harmless. (53) is also assigned a single structure, but no one 
occupies an A-bar specifier position in it, whence it must block how-extraction. 
(52) How did everyone behave? 
(53) 	 * How did no one behave? 
Sz&Z followed RM in this respect. The claim that certain interveners hurt 
because, being A-bar specifiers, they break a government chain, was replaced by 
the claim that they hurt because non-upward monotone paths do not preserve 
partial order -- but the assumption that upward monotone interveners QUA INTER-
VENERS are harmless became part and parcel of the theory. 
Results by E.Kiss' (1991) and de Swart (1991) indicate that this assumption 
is wrong. In addition to pointing out the island creating effect of iterative adverbs, 
cf. (49), de Swart also notes that sentences like (54) are potentially ambiguous, 
and they are ungrammatical on the narrow scope universal reading. And, as we 
shall see, (52) is also ungrammatical on the same reading. 
(54) 	 Combien ont-ils tous Ju de livres? 
how many have they all read of books 
'For each of them. tell me what number of books he read' 
*'For what number, they all read that number of books' 
In retrospect, the conclusion that upward quantifiers are not harmless when 
they expressly take narrow scope had been anticipated in Szabolcsi (1983, 1986) 
and in Szabolcsi and Zwarts' (1991) chapter on gradience in the strength of 
islands. Because of the conflict with RM, however, the pertinent data were 
excluded from the core set on which the Sz&Z account was based. 8 
4 Weak islands and scope 
In what follows I will assume that weak islands are a scope phenomenon. That 
is, I adopt the following informal version of E.Kiss' ( 1991) and de Swart's (199 l) 
proposals as a point of departure: 
(55) 	 The weak island effect comes about when the wh-phrase should 
take wide scope over some operator but it is unable to. 
(56) 	 Harmless interveners are only harmless in that they can give rise 
to at least one reading that presents no scopal conflict of the above 
sort: they can 'get out of the way'. 
E.Kiss and de Swart present their proposals in terms of filters. 9 Developing a 
formal semantic explanation, at least two questions need to be asked; 
(57) 	 Why are non-individual wh-phrases restricted in their scope-taking 
abilities'? 
(58) 	 What interveners are able to 'get out of the way', and how? 
8 Whether Relativized Minimality can be restated to cope with these data is 
left as an open question. The restatement would involve a modified concept of LF 
and/or a modified definition of relevant interveners. 
9 (i) 'Specificity Filter: If Op; is an operator which has scope over 
Op, and binds a variable in the scope of Opi, then Op; must be specific' [in the 
sense of Em, (1991)). (Kiss 1991) 
(ii) 'A quantifier 0 1 can only separate a quantifier O, from its 
restrictive clause if 0 1 has wide scope over 02.' (De Swart 1991) 
In the following sections l will focus on (57). An answer to (58) is to be 
developed in Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1992), within the context of how scope 
behavior is determined by the meanings of the specific quantifiers. Before turning 
to (57), however, I provide a brief overview of some results in the literature that 
pertain to (58), and indicate their relation to the monotonicity hypotheses in 
Sz&Z. 
An intervenerrn is harmless iff (i) it is scopeless, or (ii) it can take wide 
scope over the wh-phrase (family of questions reading), or (iii) it can participate 
in a scope independent reading with the given wh-phrase (branching, cumulative. 
etc. readings). The reason why (Relativim:I Minimality and) Sz&Z's proposal 
could be descriptively almost correct is that typically, though not all and only. 
upward monotone items have options (i) through (iii). 
Let us first n:strict our attention to quantifiers. The case of (i) is rather 
straightforward: Zimmermann (1991) shows that principal ultraftlters are SCOPE-
LESS. As regards (ii), both Groenendijk and Stokhof ( 1984) and Higginbotham 
(1991) claim that all quantifiers that are not downward monotone can give rise to 
a FAMILY OF QUESTIONS reading. These quantifiers have non-empty minimal 
elements ( =sets of individuals); the question is to be answered for e.ach individual 
in some MINIMAL ELEME!'.T. Definites and, in general, universals, denote filters: 
they have a unique not necessarily empty minimal element (e.g., in the case of 
II rhe men Ii and II evny man II, the set of men). Here we get the classical pair-list 
answers (see also Chierchia (1992)). Indefinites have more than one minimal 
element (e.g., the minimal elements of I! two men 11 are all two-member subsets 
of the set of men). In this case the answerer has to choose one minimal element 
and give a pair-list answer for the individuals in it. G&S call this a choice read-
ing. 
(59) 	 Who did every man !>Ce? 
Man 1 saw Mary, man1 saw Susan, etc. 
(60) 	 Who did two men see? 
For instance, John saw Susan, and Bill saw Jill. 
Jt is remarkable that according to G&S, both exactly five men and m most five 
men, which were found problematic in (48), give rise to the choice reading (the 
latter does because it is supposed to allow for an upward monotone group read-
ing). Downward monotone quantifiers do not support the family of questions 
reading, since their minimal element is empty. 
These generalizations nee.cl significant refinement; for instance, they do not 
10 The notion 'intervener' needs to be made more precise. Cases of the type 
*Who didn't destroy this city? will show that any item that crucially enters into 
the computation of an answer counts as an 'intervener', even if it syntactically 
does not intervene between the wh-phrase and its trace. 
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explain the observation (de Swart's and our own) that adverbs like twice, a lot, 
and even always, and modified indefinites like at least two men, do not give rise 
to family of questions readings. Another salient fact to be explained is that the 
family of questions reading is not available in every language, e.g., in Hungarian. 
But even in this preliminary form they provide a partial explanation of why 
downward monotone interveners were found to create weak islands. As they do 
not give rise to the family of questions readings, at least one option to 'get out 
of the way' is unavailable to them. 
As regards (iii), three kinds of scope independent readings have been noted 
in the literature: BRANCHING (Barwise 1979), CUMULATIVE (Scha 1981), and 
intermediate ones (van der Does 1992, Verkuyl 1992). 
(61) 	 Three students read two books. (branching) 
'There is a set S of three students, and there is a set B of two 
books, and every member of S read every member of B' 
(62) 	 Three students read two books. (cumulative) 
'There is a set S of three students, and there is a set B of two 
books, and every member of S read at least one member of B, and 
every member of B was read by at least one member of S' 
Liu (1990, 1991) conducted an empirical study of what noun phrases parti-
cipate in branching readings in sentences like (61). She identifies a subset of noun 
phrases denoting upward monotone quantifiers; she calls them G(ENERALIZED)-
SPEC!FIC. These include definites, universals, and indefinites not modified by at 
least, at most or exactly; wh-phrases are also among them. A branching analysis 
is always available whenever both noun phrases are G-specific. (No similar study 
of the restrictions on cumulative readings has been carried out yet.) Questions that 
may be analyzed as exhibiting these readings are as follows: 
(63) 	 How many circles did everyone draw? (branching) 
'Everyone drew the same number of circles -- how many was it' 
(64) 	 How many circles did these two people draw? (cumulative) 
'altogether how many circles' 
In a chapter on GRADIENCE, Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1991) observed that 
downward monotone interveners create the most robust weak islands, while Liu's 
G-specific noun phrases are the most innocent even among the upward monotone 
ones. These observations are immediately explained once we think about weak 
islands in terms of scope. Downward NPs have only a narrow scope reading, 
whereas G-specific Nps have the greatest number of non-narrow scope readings. 
(Below I return to the question why independent readings are good.) 
Going beyond quantifiers, note finally that intervening scopal particles 
(NEG) and verbs (deny, regret) have no chance to 'get out of the way'. The same 
holds for intervening wh-phrases: if who in *How do you wonder who behaved? 
look matrix scope, the subcategorization of wonder would be violated. 
Although much more work is needed to clarify the semantic conditions of 
scope interaction between wh-phrases and quantifiers, with this I take it that the 
global plausibility of the scope account is established. 
5 Individuality and scope 
This section addresses the question why certain wh-phrases cannot take wide 
scope and are thus sensitive to weak islands. I will adhere to the claim, advanced 
in Sz&Z and elaborated in 2, that the crucial property these wh-phrases have is 
that they do not range over individuals, i.e., over members of unordered sets. 
The essence of the claim to be put forth is as follows: 
(65) 	 For a wh-phrase to take wide scope over another scope bearing 
element SBE means that operations associated with SBE need to be 
performed in the domain of wh in order to compute an answer. 
When a wh-phrase ranges over discrete individuals, these can be 
collected into unordered sets. All Boolean operations can be per-
formed on sets. When a wh-phrase does not range over discrete 
individuals, only a smaller set of operations (possibly none) are 
available in its domain, hence answers cannot be computed in the 
general case. 
Discussion will proceed in three steps. Section 5.1 justifies claim (65). 5.2 
provides new empirical support for the claim that it is precisely this notion of 
individuality that plays a role here. It will be shown that when some argument of 
a verb necessarily denotes a sum, it is affected by weak islands, however 'refer-
ential' it may be in thematic role or discourse terms. 5.3 argues that whether a 
domain consists of sums or unordered sets depends on whether the predicate is 
iterative and summative in the pertinent respect. 
5.1 Scope and operations 
Let us begin by asking what 'taking wide scope' means (for present purposes, at 
least). Consider the following questions, on the wide scope who reading: 
(66) 	 Who did Fido see? 
(67) 	 Who didn't Fido see? 
(68) 	 Who did every dog see? 
(69) 	 Who did at least two dogs see? 
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I assume that the interpretation of questions, whatever it should precisely be, 
includes that an exhaustive list is determined by the answer. I will be concerned 
with how such a list can be computed or verified. 
The steps to be described will of course be unsurprising. For (66) we form 
the set of people that Fido saw, and list its members. For (67), we form the com-
plement of this set. For (68), we take the sets of individuals that each dog saw, 
intersect them, and list the members of the intersection. If (69) had at least one 
dog, we would simply take the sets of individuals that each dog saw and union 
them. The presence of two makes life more complicated: we have to take a lot of 
intersections in order to determine whether the same individual shows up in at 
least two sets. (The algorithm is of no interest here.) These contrast with the pair-
list reading of (68), for instance, where no Boolean operation needs to be per-
formed. 
The moral is that for a wh-phrase to take WIDE scoPE OVER some scope-
bearing element SBE means that the computation/verification of the answer 
involves specific OPERATIONS associated with SBE. 
Notice three respects in which this definition is rather general. First, it does 
not require for the narrow scope SBE to become referentially dependent on the 
wide scope taker, hence SBEs like negation are covered. Second, it does not 
require for the wide scope taker to 'bind a variable' in the scope of the narrow 
scope SBE; it is structurally neutral. Third, the definition would easily extend 
from wh-phrases to arbitrary quantifiers. 
In this paper I restrict my attention to simple cases as above, where the 
operations associated with SBE are just the BOOLEAN operations. I will not try 
to explicate what operations are involved when a wh-phrase takes scope over a 
factive verb, for instance. 
A simple consequence of the above is that a particular wh-phrase is able to 
take scope over some SBE iff the requisite operations are available in the domain 
the wh-phrase ranges over. In (67)-(69) this was no problem. Person that Fido 
saw denotes a set of individuals; an UNORDERED SET. Unions, intersections, and 
complements are defined for this domain. But are these operations available in the 
domains of all wh-phrases? 
In section 2 I argued that island-sensitive wh-phrases do not range over 
individuals but, rather, elements of PARTIALLY ORDERED domains. To be more 
specific, their domain will be said to have the structure of a join semilattice. The 
following are standard definitions: 
(70) a. A BooLEAN ALGEBRA is a partially ordered set closed under un-
ions, intersections, and complements. 
b. A LATTICE is a partially ordered set closed under unions and 
intersections. 
C. A JOIN SEMILATTICE is a partially ordered set closed under unions. 
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Join semilattices have been proposed for various domains, e.g. mass terms and 
plurals. Manner expressions resemble mass terms in most respects. For instance, 
if John behave,d kindly but wildly, then the components of his behavior do not 
form a set {kindly, wildly} but, rather, a single object that is made up of kindness 
and wildness. The conjunction can be written as kindly ID wildly, where ID is 
interprete,d as the sum -- union -- operation. Note that it must be union, not 
intersection. A kind but wild behavior is not one that has just the features com-
mon to both kindness and wildness; it is what you get when you put the two 
together. It is another matter whether the people who behave,d kindly but wildly 
are in the intersection of those who behave,d kindly and those who behave,d 
wildly. (The answer depends on whether we regard behave as a distributive 
pre,dicate; if we do not, only a weaker relation will hold.) 
The following diagrams illustrate the structures of a Boolean algebra and a 
join semilattice: 
(71) that who Fido saw € A rhe way how John behaved € B 
A: {john, mary} 
{john} 0 {mary} B: [kindly ID wildly] [kindly]~ [wildly] 
0 
The semilattice B is not closed under complements and intersections. Therefore, 
the computation/verification of an answer must not depend on these operations: 
an expression that ranges over the elements of a join semilattice cannot take scope 
over negation or a universal quantifier (or over any more complex operator whose 
definition inescapably incorporates at least one of these). 
The union operation that is available in the join semilattice does allow for 
some computations, though. For instance, whether entity A is part of entity B, 
or whether two entities are identical, can be checke,d using only unions: 
(72) a. If A £ B, then A U B B 
b. If A £ B and B £ A, then A= B 
Thus, for instance, the answer to a question like Did John pay at least three 
cents? can be compute,d by checking whether the amount John paid is bigger than, 
or equal to, three cents. 
(73) has no intersective reading: if Mary behave,d clumsily but nicely, Peter 
loudly but nicely, and John quietly and nicely, (73) cannot be asking for 'Nicely' 
as an answer. It does have the wide scope universal (family of questions) reading. 
But, as E.Kiss (1991) observe,d, it has an additional good interpretation: 
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(73) 	 How did everyone behave? 
'What was the uniform behavior exhibited by everyone?' 
This presupposes, rather than asserts, that everyone behaved in the same way. 
This is an extremely strong presupposition, whence (73) cannot be used as an 
innocent question. But once this presupposition is granted, we do not need to take 
intersections. Since everyone behaved in the same way, it is sufficient to inspect 
an arbitrary person's behavior and report that. This reading can also be regarded 
as a special instance of branching quantification, with a slight extension of the 
notion. The two fully connected entities are the set of persons and the unique 
(full) behavior that characterizes every person. More important to us now is the 
fact that this reading does not require the performance of intersections. 
At this point the question arises why we insist that answers be laboriously 
'computed'. Instead, we could just look at every individual in our universe and 
check whether it exhibits the property of being seen by Fido, not being seen by 
Fido, being seen by every dog, and being seen by at least two dogs. Let us call 
this the 'look-up' procedure. For look-up, the properties in (67) through (69) are 
as simple as the property of being seen by Fido: look-up does not really take 
cogniz.ance of the fact that who is taking scope over some scope-bearing element. 
Look-up is viable because we assume that each individual is a 'peg', from which 
all its properties are hanging, cf. Landman (1986). 
But this procedure cannot be general. For one thing, we certainly do not 
want to exclude the possibility of being able to compute even those things that can 
be looked up. On the other hand, not everything that we can talk about is a 'peg'. 
For instance, it is natural to look at the Fido-peg and find that Fido is loud and 
weighs twenty pounds -- but it is not natural to have a loudness peg with the 
information that Fido is loud, or a twenty-pounds peg with the information that 
Fido weighs twenty pounds. (Unless, of course, context forced us to individuate 
loudness and twenty pounds by requiring, for instance, that the presence of these 
particular properties be checked in every dog.) This means that a question like 
How much do at least two dogs weigh? cannot be answered by looking at every 
weight peg and finding out whether it exhibits the property that at least two dogs 
have it. The answer has to be computed by manipulating information obtained by 
looking at dogs -- and then the question whether the requisite operations are 
available is crucial. 
I am convinced that 'look-up' plays an important role in a pragmatic/proce-
dural model. But it does not eliminate the need for computation, and hence it does 
not eliminate the vulnerability of wh-phrases that denote in an impoverished 
domain. 
It may be important to point out a difference between the roles this proposal 
and Sz&Z assign to partial ordering. Take the example of idiom chunks. Accord-
ing to Rizzi (1990), their extraction is sensitive to weak islands because they do 
not have a referential index. If idiom chunks do not have any reference at all, 
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even an abstract kind, then Sz&Z made the wrong prediction here because such 
things cannot exhibit a partial order, and hence cannot be interested in its preser-
vation. In contrast, the present proposal makes the correct prediction: idiom 
chunks do not refer to things that can be collected into unordered sets, whence 
the Boolean operations are not available for answer computation. 
5.2 Unique arguments and weak islands 
Although the analysis sketched in 5.1 is logically plausible, one may still be 
uncertain whether the lack of Boolean structure alone is sufficient to lead to 
island-sensitivity. In this section I will discuss a set of extractors which, as far as 
I can see, share nothing else but this aspect with the standard items discussed so 
far, and are nevertheless systematically subject to weak islands. 
The distinction between iterable and 'one time only' predicates is familiar 
from the aspectual literature. For instance, show this letter to Mary and get a 
letter from Mary are iterable: it is possible to show the same letter (token) to 
Mary, or to get a letter from Mary, more than once. Get this letter from Mary, 
destroy this building, and win the Rimer Cup in 1978 are 'one time only' predi-
cates: it is not possible to get the same letter (token), or to destroy the same 
building (token), more than once; similarly for winning the Rimel Cup, a unique 
object, in a given year. But get one's favorite letter from Mary is again not a 
'one time only' predicate, due to the bound variable. 
Here I will be concerned with a specific consequence of the 'one time only' 
property, namely, that it imposes a unicity requirement on the arguments and the 
adjuncts of the predicate. This can be demonstrated as follows. In the iterable 
(74) examples the distributive answer John did and Bill did is as acceptable as 
John and Bill did. In 'one time only' (75), the former is unacceptable: John and 
Bill must form a collective recipient . Similarly, in (74) the short (exhaustive) 
answer Bill can be modified by only. In (75) it cannot or, more precisely, if only 
is acceptable, it must mean 'alone' and not 'exclusively'. The effect disappears 
in (76). 
(74) a. Who showed this letter to Mary? 
John and Bill did / John did and Bill did. 
Bill did / Only Bill did. 
b. Who got a letter from Mary? 
John and Bill did / John did and Bill did. 
Bill did / Only Bill did. 
(75) a. Who got this letter from Mary? 
John and Bill did / * John did and Bill did. 
Bill did / (*) Only Bill did. 
b. Who destroyed this building? 
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John and Bill did / * John did and Bill did. 
Bill did / (*) Only Bill did. 
c. 	 Who won the Rimet Cup in 1978?  
Argentina did / * Only Argentina did.  
(76) 	 Who got his favorite letter from Mary? 
John and Bill did / John did and Bill did. 
Bill did / Only Bill did. 
The same observations apply to other arguments and adjuncts, e.g., 
(77) 	 From whom did you get this letter? 
From Mary / (*) Only from Mary. 
(78) 	 When did you get this letter? 
Yesterday/ Only yesterday [=not earlier]. 
This phenomenon, together with its consequences for scope, was observed in 
Szabolcsi (I 986: 334-7). In what follows I will somewhat enlarge the set of data 
and spell out the explanation in terms of the present proposal. 
(79) and (80) indicate that the who subject or experiencer of an iterable 
predicate can take scope over negation or a universal, while the who subject or 
source of a 'one time only' predicate cannot. (An existential would eliminate the 
'one time only' property in the latter case, so it cannot be tested.) (81) and (82) 
show a similar contrast with a factive and a wh-island; a PP argument is extracted 
in order to eliminate irrelevant difficulties with subject extraction. 
(79) 	 a. Who dido' t show this letter to Mary? 
To whom didn't you show this letter? 
b.* 	 Who didn't get this letter from Mary?  
From whom didn't you get this letter?  
(80) 	 a. Who showed every letter to Mary? 
To whom did you show every letter? 
b.* 	 Who got every letter from Mary?  
From whom did you get every letter?  
[unless pair-list or same person for every letter]  
(81) 	 a. To whom do you regret having shown this letter? 
b.* From whom do you regret having gotten this letter? 
(82) 	 a. To whom do you wonder whether I showed this letter? 
b.* From whom do you wonder whether I got this letter? 
The sensitivity of these arguments to weak islands cannot be explained with 
reference to thematic roles or discourse factors. The thematic roles are equally 
'referential' in all cases, and there can hardly be a coherent notion of D-linking 
or specificity that would distinguish the 'one time' arguments from the others. On 
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the other hand, the absence of the unicity requirement means that show this letter 
to Mary denotes a set of individuals of whom the predicate holds independently, 
whereas the presence of the unicity requirement means that get this letter from 
Mary denotes a sum of whose parts the predicate does not hold independently: 
(83) ,x[get the letter from Mary (x)] = [John EB Bill] 
Since sums form a semilattice, the explanation in the previous section carries 
over. 
A last interesting point to note here is that exactly the same effect is ob-
served whether the sum-term is a subject or a source, although in the former case 
negation and the object universal do not syntactically intervene between the wh-
phrase and its trace. This supports the definition of wide scope taking given in the 
previous section, which refers to the necessity to perform certain operations in the 
computation/verification of the answer, rather than to the wide scope taker's 
binding a variable within the syntactic scope of the other operator. 
.S.3 Event structure and set fonnation 
In this section I propose a connection between certain properties of predicates and 
the question whether the denotation of a particular parameter is an element of an 
ordered or of an unordered set. 'Parameter' serves as a cover term for both 
arguments and adjuncts in the grammatical sense. Details of answer computation 
will also be made more precise. 
The basic idea derives from Carlson's (1984: 274) suggestion that bearers 
of thematic roles are unique per event. ' ... if there is a proposed event with, say, 
two themes, then there are (at least) two events and not one'. Informal though his 
proposal is, Carlson is careful to note that on the group reading of John and Bob 
threw the chest into the ocean we have a single event with the collective of John 
and Bill as its unique Agent, and in Bob washed the car, the car is the Theme, 
and its parts are not. 
I dub events characterized by thematic uniqueness MINIMAL EVENTS (e,.11): 
(84) a. visit([Rome ])([John])([ em1;]) entails (b), (c) 
b. ,x[visit([Rome])(x)([em1J)] = [John] 
C. ,x[visit((x)[John])([em1J)] = [Rome] 
Enclosed in square brackets are objects coming from 'overpopulated' Linkean 
domains (join semilattices) of various sorts. In adherence to Carlson's intuition, 
[John EB Bob], i.e., the sum of John and Bob, is used only if the predicate does not 
distribute over the parts of the plural object. I will call semilattice objects SLOB-
JECTS and usually suppress the square brackets. 
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How do we come to think of the denotations of visited Rome and John 
visited as sets of slobjects? I submit that the reason is that these predicates allow 
us to lump several minimal events together and, at the same time, to collect the 
unique slobjects corresponding to the pertinent parameter into an unordered set. 
This re.quires that the relation between events and objects be summative: 11 
(85) 	 A relation R [between events and objects] is sUMMATIVE iff 
R(e,x) /\ R(e',x ')-+ R(eue·, xUx '). 
Visited Rome is summative: If John visited Rome and Bill visited Rome, then 
John and Bill visited Rome -- according to the present intuition, the last clause 
describes a non-minimal event. Similarly for John visited. I assume that summa-
tivity has to be non-vacuous: it presupposes that it is possible for there to be two 
distinct events that we can lump together. If the description of the predicate itself 
involves a parameter, then this means the relation has to be iterable with respect 
to that parameter. It must be possible for there to be two distinct events involving 
the same object: 
(86) 	 A relation R [between events and objects] is ITERABLE iff 
03e3e'3e-3y[e'~e /\ e-~e /\ e';ce- /\ R(e',y) /\ R(e-,y)] 
The x visited relation between a minimal event and Rome is iterable. On the other 
hand, the x destroyed relation between a minimal event and Rome is not iterable 
(in the token sense to which I adhere): the same city cannot be destroyed more 
than once. 
NON-ITERABILITY means that the predicate describes a biunique relation be-
tween slobjects and minimal events. I encode this by writing the event parameter 
as a FUNCTION of that other parameter with respect to which the event is not 
iterative, (The agent may be so written, too, but it does not seem necessary.) 
(87) 	 destroy(Rome)(Bob)(f,(Rome)) 
Prior to proceeding to the description of events involving manners and 
amounts, let us see how the above assumptions are utilized in set formation. I will 
use 'set' to mean unordered set, unless otherwise specified. 
I stipulate that SET FORMATION takes place iff the predicate is both surn-
mative and iterable. On the basis of (84) we can form the standard denotation of 
the predicate visit Rome, the set of those who visit Rome, as follows: 
(88) 	 >.x(3e3l[e =U,,1 em1; /\ x e U,,1{x: [visit(Rorne)(x)(em1)]}J] 
11 This definition as well as (86) and (99) are borrowed from Krifka (1990). 
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The first step is to form the set of those who visited Rome at some particular 
minimal event. This will be a singleton. Then, for all minimal events id, we 
union the singletons of those whose visited Rome at em1,, and thus form the set of 
those who ever visited Rome (within the event range defined by I). At the same 
time, the minimal events are lumped together into one big event e (here union 
amounts to sum formation). 
The empirical claim that is being made here is that non-iterable and/or non-
summative relations do not feed set formation. For instance, the linguistic fact 
that there can be at most one slobject that destroyed Rome might be expressed by 
saying that it is an element of the singleton set denoted by destroy Rome but 
I will NOT say that. The denotation of a non-iterable predicate remains a slobject. 
The intuition behind this is that a predicate denotes a set iff it can in principle 
hold of more than one thing independently. Empirical support for this intuition 
comes from the data reviewed in 5.2, i.e., the fact that the questioning of a 
unique parameter is sensitive to weak islands. 
The computation of an answer to Who visited Rome? now involves (88), but 
that of an answer to Who destroyed Rome? can involve only (89): 
(89) ix[destroy(Rome)(x)(f,(Rome))] = ? 
As regards Who didn't visit Rome?, Mw visited every city?, and Who 
visited a(ny) city?, the reasoning in 5.1 can be reproduced as follows. Ifwe have 
sets, as in (88), we can form their complements, or we can intersect and union 
them with others. The outputs also feed the Boolean operations. 
(90) U - >.x[3e3I[e =LJ.,1 em1, /\ x t LJ.,i{x: [visit(Rome)(x)(em1;)]}]] =? 
(91) nruN(AX[3e3I[e =U,d em/, /\ x t U.i{x: [visit(cityn)(x)(em1;)]}]]) = ? 
(92} LJ0 ,N(Ax[3e3I(e =U,i em1; /\ x f U,1{ x: [visit(city0 )(x)(em1J]}]]) ? 
But since destroy Rome does not denote a set, no complement can be formed, and 
Who didn't destroy Rome? is correctly predicted to be ungrammatical. Similarly, 
Who destroyed every city? cannot have a reading parallel to (91 ). The same 
sentence is grammatical on the family of questions reading (which does not 
concern us here) and on the reading which presupposes that the same person 
destroyed every city, cf. (73). This latter will be expressed roughly as follows: 
(93) ix't'z(destroy(city z)(x)(f,(z))] ? 
It might be tempting to revise the set formation assumptions to allow for an 
alternative representation of this reading. The intersection of singletons is non-
empty iff the singletons are identical: 
(94) n,r{ x: [destroy(city;)(x)(f,(city;))]} = ? 
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However, this interpretation asserts, rather than presupposes, that the same person 
destroyed every city, which seems counterintuitive. Furthermore, it would predict 
that a complement can be formed in the next step: Who didn't destroy every city? 
This is wrong, so (93) is the correct representation. 
The grammatical Who destroyed a(ny) city? may be puzzling: the destruc-
tion of each city is non-iterable, but that of an arbitrary city is. Due to the first 
fact we cannot use (92). But we can capitalize on the fact that precisely in this 
case the event parameter is a function of the theme, whence they share an index: 
(95) 	 Xx[3e3I[e =U..i em1, A x c U.i{x: [destroy(city;)(x)(em1;)]}]] = ? 
With these considerations in mind, we can tum to the classical cases of 
manners and amounts. 
First, the slobject denoted by the MANNER parameter is typically a sum: 
(96) 	 behave([kindlyEB stupidly ])([John])([ em1,D 
Second, while both the behaved kindly and/but stupidly and the John behaved 
relations are iterable, summativity fails (we never get cumulative readings): 
(97) 	 John behaved kindly at event e and John behaved stupidly at event e, 
; ....... John behaved kindly and stupidly at eUe' 
(98) 	 John behaved kindly at event e and Bob behaved stupidly at event e 
; ....... John and Bob behaved kindly and stupidly at event e 
As a consequence, set formation does not take place. How didn't you behave? and 
How did everyone behave? are both out on the wide scope how reading. The 
latter sentence has a family of questions reading and one analogous to (93). 
AMOUNTS may arise in two different ways, cf. John weighs ninety pounds 
and John visited two cities. Both require an additive measure: the value assigned 
to the sum of two non-overlapping slobjects z and z, is the sum of the values 
assigned to z and to z,. 
(99) 	 The function µ is an ADDITIVE MEASURE iff 
(,zoz' A µ(z)=n A µ(z')=n') __.,. µ(zUz')=n+n' 
For the sake of simplicity, I will only examine the two cities type. Following 
Krifka (1990), I take city to be the measure function. As long as the measured 
objects do not overlap, the summativity tests that failed above will work here, and 
we get cumulative readings: 
(I00) 	 John visited six cities at e and John visited five cities at e' 
-+ John visited eleven cities at eUe' 
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(101) 	 John visited six cities ate and Bob visited five cities ate 
-+ John and Bob visited eleven cities at e 
These measures are not part of the characterization of the minimal event: 
measuring is an operation performed on sets or slobjects assembled on the basis 
of minimal events. In How many cities did John visit?, for instance, the set of 
cities that John visited is constructed and µ is applied to that set: 
(102) 	 µ(Xx[3e3I[e =U,1 em1; /\ x f LJ;,i{c: [visit(c)(John)(em1,)]}]]) = ? 
Similarly, a good reading can be computed for How many cities didn't you visit?, 
etc. by measuring the complement of the set of cities visited: 12 
(103) 	 µ(U - Xx[3e3l[e =LJ,,1 emli /\ x f U,1{c: [visit(c)(John)(em1,)J}J)) ? 
For the cumulative reading of John and Boh visited eleven cities, the two sets of 
cities are unioned before measuring (I do not provide a general algorithm here): 
(104) 	 µ((Xx[3e3l[e =U,, em1; /\ x c LJ,,1{c: [visit(c)(John)(em;;)]}]]) LJ 
(Xx[3e3I[e =U,1em1, /\ x f U,1{c: [visit(c)(Bob)(em;;)]}]])) ? 
Measuring differs from the Boolean operations in two respects: its input does not 
have to be a set, and its output is certainly not a set. For the latter reason µ 
cannot be followed by the Boolean operations. How many cities didn't you visit? 
is ungrammatical on the reading that asks for the complement of the number of 
cities visited, and so on. 
In other words, there are two reasons why Boolean operations may be 
unavailable: one is that we were never able to form sets, and the other is that our 
sets were subjected to an operation whose value is itself not a set. 
12 This option is not available for *How many circles didn't John draw? if 
drawing is understood as creation, and John is not contrastive. This question is 
equivalent to *How many circles aren't there?; there is no complement that could 
be formed. I suggest that to capture this, and the behavior of pure amount read-
ings in general, we measure non-iterable events directly. The elaboration of this 
suggestion goes beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
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